At the international high-level conference “Neutrality from Different Perspectives: Between Tradition and Pragmatism,” organized by the Geneva Center for Neutrality and the Institute for Global Negotiation held in Bern on 6 May 2026, Dr. Joachim Adler - Head of Defence Policy at the Swiss State Secretariat for Security Policy (SEPOS), addressed one of the most complex and intensely debated topics in contemporary Swiss foreign and security policy: the meaning, purpose, and future of Swiss neutrality.

Dr. Adler began by placing Swiss neutrality in its historical context. During the Napoleonic era and in the political order that emerged afterward, Switzerland served a crucial geopolitical function as a buffer state between Europe’s traditional rival powers - France and the German states, later Germany. In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, it was in both Swiss and broader European interests for Switzerland to remain outside great-power competition, acting as a neutral space that belonged to neither side.

To understand the roots of Swiss neutrality, Dr. Adler argued, one must return to this historical reality. Switzerland was not only geographically positioned between competing powers; it was also internally diverse, composed of French-speaking, German-speaking, Italian-speaking, and Romansh-speaking communities. Neutrality therefore served not only external security purposes, but also an essential domestic function: preserving internal cohesion in a country whose cultural and linguistic identities were closely connected to neighboring powers. This internal dimension became particularly evident during World War I. At that time, Switzerland’s greatest danger may not have been foreign invasion, but rather internal fragmentation. Neutrality helped maintain national unity by preventing the country from being drawn into the opposing political and emotional loyalties of its neighboring states.

At the same time, Dr. Adler emphasized, that neutrality was never an end in itself. Rather, it was always an instrument - an instrument of national cohesion, security policy, and strategic survival. Legally, Swiss neutrality rested on a stable foundation in the Hague Convention of 1907. Before the creation of the United Nations and the adoption of the UN Charter, this legal framework was relatively clear and uncontested. Based on this core legal structure, Switzerland developed a flexible neutrality policy that adapted to changing circumstances.

According to Dr. Adler, this flexibility was critical to Switzerland’s survival during World War II. Switzerland remained neutral not because its policy was rigid, but precisely because its implementation of neutrality was pragmatic and adaptable. Today, however, the geopolitical environment has fundamentally changed. The frontlines of Europe no longer end at the Swiss border. Switzerland is now surrounded by partners and allies rather than historical adversaries. As Dr. Adler noted, Switzerland has even been described as “the hole in the donut”- geographically surrounded by friendly states, yet politically distinct.

At the same time, the legal and political foundations of neutrality are increasingly being challenged. The post-1945 international order, built around the UN Charter and its prohibition on the use of force, raises new questions about the very concept of neutrality. Can a state still claim neutrality in a world where aggressive war is prohibited under international law? These questions have become particularly urgent in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Dr. Adler noted that while many of Switzerland’s European partners understand that Switzerland remains neutral, they increasingly question how Switzerland interprets that neutrality, especially regarding issues such as sanctions, arms exports, and the re-export of Swiss military equipment. This has triggered an important national debate: What is the strategic purpose of neutrality today? Does neutrality still enhance Swiss security? Should neutrality remain flexible, as it historically was, or should it become more constitutionally fixed, as proposed in current domestic political initiatives, particularly by the federal referendum on neutrality this autumn in Switzerland?

Dr. Adler concluded by pointing to the changing nature of warfare. Neutrality was conceptually easier when conflicts were fought primarily on land. Today’s conflicts increasingly unfold in hybrid domains - cyberspace, outer space, economic warfare, information operations - raising entirely new legal and strategic questions. How does neutrality function in cyber conflict? How does a neutral state position itself in space security? Can traditional neutrality law still provide meaningful security in the 21st century?

Switzerland continues to uphold the principle of armed neutrality, based on the assumption that neutrality only has meaning if it can be defended militarily. Yet this raises another difficult question: are Switzerland’s armed forces fully capable of defending both the country and its neutrality in today’s complex security environment?

Dr. Adler’s central message was clear: Switzerland has remained neutral throughout history not because neutrality was static, but because it was intelligently and pragmatically adapted to changing geopolitical realities. The real question facing Switzerland today is not whether neutrality should continue, but how it must evolve in order to remain relevant.